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Abstract 
 On 12 January 2010, a 7.0-magnitude earthquake struck Haiti, causing severe 
destruction in Port-au-Prince and surrounding areas. Individuals, 
organisations, and governments donated over US$6 billion of aid to Haiti. 
However, the international humanitarian response to the earthquake was 
characterised by western media as a logistical disaster. Years after the 
earthquake, hundreds of thousands of Haitians still inhabited “temporary” 
camps where they sought refuge after the earthquake, rather than returning to 
their neighbourhoods. Why did the international relief and recovery effort fail? 
This author argues that the international humanitarian community’s failure to 
collect, utilise, and share data led to shortcomings in aid delivery. Based on de 
Ville de Goyet’s hypothesis that supply and personnel distribution is largely 
driven by the discursive framework of the media rather than by evidenced 
need, I conducted an analysis of the American and Canadian media’s discourses 
following the earthquake. This study identified a strong correlation between 
media discourse and aid distribution, confirming that it is probable that donors 
and international humanitarian aid workers made decisions based on an 
understanding of the situation gleaned from western media. The international 
community’s fears of Haitian corruption, inefficiency, and poor governance 
meant that rather than supporting the Haitian government, the international 
community circumvented it. Implementing their own agendas without the 
input of Haitians, they infringed upon the sovereignty of the Haitian state. 
Keywords: data, disaster recovery, disaster relief, earthquake, Haiti, 
humanitarian aid, information management, international development, media 
discourse, USAID 
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Introduction 
“When I came in, Haiti was not governed by Haitians anymore. 
Probably mostly by NGOs. And that has done what to Haiti? It 
has weakened our institution.” 
- Michel Martelly, president of Haiti 
On 12 January 2010, at 4:53pm, a 7.0-magnitude earthquake, known by 
Haitians as Goudougoudou, struck Haiti for 35 seconds in what was the third-
most fatal natural disaster in recent history (Gros, 2011, pp. 131-132; Bellegarde-
Smith, 2011, p. 265). The earthquake, whose epicentre was a shallow 16 
kilometres below the town of Léogâne, caused severe destruction in Léogâne, 
Port-au-Prince, Gressier, Petit-Goâve, Grand-Goâve, Jacmel, and Miragoâne, 
killed approximately 222,570 people, injured 300,000 people and left 1.5 million 
people homeless  (Benjamin, et al., 2011, p. 307; UN Office of the Secretary-
General, 2010, p. 1). The destruction of infrastructure in Port-au-Prince, 
including the headquarters of most government ministries, the Parliament, the 
courts, and the National Palace, significantly undermined the capacity of the 
Haitian government. Homes and businesses collapsed, roads were blocked by 
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debris, communications systems were down, and the port for which the city is 
named was closed. Damages and losses due to the earthquake were estimated 
to be equivalent to 120% of Haiti’s 2009 GDP. Over one million Haitians moved 
into 460 temporary settlement sites (or “camps”) in Port-au-Prince. An 
unknown number moved into camps elsewhere (UN Office of the Secretary-
General, 2010, pp. 1-2). Cholera, which had already been a public health issue in 
Haiti due to inadequate water sanitation infrastructure, spread rapidly through 
camps and refugee settlements (Ivers, et al., 2010, pp. 2048-2049).  
There was an immediate outpouring of aid from the international 
community, surpassing the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami to become the largest 
ever humanitarian response to an acute natural disaster (Altay & Labonte, 2014, 
p. S50). Within 72 hours, the United States, Canada, Cuba, and several other 
countries had begun sending emergency relief personnel to Haiti. The United 
States and Canada sent military troops, and Cuba sent medics (UN Office of the 
Secretary-General, 2010, p. 2; Bellegarde-Smith, 2011, pp. 269-270). The World 
Food Programme, which had emergency rations stored in a warehouse in Port-
au-Prince, provided initial food assistance to 3.5 million people (UN Office of 
the Secretary-General, 2010, p. 3). Aid workers distributed emergency tents and 
other supplies to hundreds of thousands of families. In an emergency appeal by 
the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN 
OCHA), $5.5 billion was pledged by various countries and intergovernmental 
organisations for earthquake relief and recovery. (UN Office of the Special 
Envoy for Haiti, 2012).  
The western media’s response to the earthquake was problematic, 
containing much incorrect information and speculation (Lundy, 2011a, p. 128). 
First, the media paid significant attention to those public figures with 
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sensationalist explanations of the earthquake—for example that it was the 
result of God’s punishment for the Haitian slave revolt and revolution of 1804 
or a United States military exercise—rather than those questioning issues of 
planning and infrastructure. Secondly, the media was often blatantly racist, 
speculating that Haitians would begin to loot and become violent. On several 
occasions, stories were published stating that looting and violence had actually 
begun, only to later be found to be untrue or exaggerated (Bellegarde-Smith, 
2011, pp. 271-272). Finally, the media presented a paternalistic image of the 
situation which situated westerners as heroes and Haitians as victims. This 
positioned it to speculate on the needs of those affected by the earthquake, 
often with little or no evidence of that need. In this dissertation, I suggest that 
the media’s influence affected the kind of aid that was received by Haiti. This is 
in line with Claude de Ville de Goyet’s (2008a) theory that the media has a 
greater influence on the direction of aid than does evidenced need, and will be 
further investigated in the first chapter. 
Much of the press coverage regarding the earthquake was in regards to 
logistical problems faced by international aid workers in Haiti, which stemmed 
in part from an unfortunate lack of data collection, sharing, and usage in the 
relief and recovery efforts. Data were often not collected because NGOs did not 
consider it to be a priority, because they believed that they had a sufficient 
grasp of the situation, or because they simply did not have adequate means to 
carry out data collection (Altay & Labonte, 2014, p. S63). Data that did exist 
were rarely shared by organisations, especially large ones, or were often 
nonstandard or incompatible with other data. Most importantly, there was no 
official central coordinating body to maintain data, delegate tasks, and regulate 
the aid that was dispatched in Haiti. Collecting and sharing information about 
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locations of buildings and survivors, hospital capacity, needs for secondary 
care, stocks of supplies, unidentified bodies, disease, and housing between aid 
organisations is essential for coordinating disaster relief (de Ville de Goyet, 
2008a, pp. 33-52). Just as many Haitians viewed the aid community as one 
collective agency (Ramachandran & Walz, 2012), the aid community should 
have functioned as one collective agency in order to effectively and efficiently 
implement disaster relief and recovery aid; data collection, sharing, and usage 
is essential in order to make this happen. 
International disaster relief and recovery aid (also known as 
international humanitarian aid) is similar to international development aid, in 
that foreigners—whether for attention-seeking, public image-minded or kind-
hearted reasons—see a need and feel a desire to assist. Both present outsiders 
with the difficulty of determining where there is a need, and both often involve 
feeding and housing a large number of people, providing medical care, and 
installing infrastructure. On 20 January 1949, President Truman brought the 
term “underdevelopment” into popular usage (Esteva, 1992, pp. 6-7; Sachs, 1992, 
p. 2), and governments, NGOs, and IGOs rushed to aid the “underdeveloped” 
countries in modernising their economies and alleviating poverty. However, the 
gap between developing and industrialised countries widened, more than 
doubling between 1960 and 1980 (Sachs, 1992, p. 3). Given that in almost seven 
decades long-term international development aid, which has the benefit of 
longer time scales, has been unsuccessful in its goals of meeting the needs of 
people living in poverty, it is not surprising that international disaster relief and 
recovery aid, a kind of “emergency development,” struggles even more to meet 
the needs of its beneficiaries. The media buzz around an acute incident such as 
a natural disaster can have a positive effect, as it prompts an influx of resources, 
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whereas traditional international development aid may have difficulties 
attracting donors for more long-term projects. However, given the quick 
response time necessary in the wake of acute disasters, there is an extra layer of 
complexity in international disaster relief aid, magnifying the need for good 
data.  
Background 
In order to understand why Goudougoudou had such a devastating 
impact on Haiti it is important to situate it within Haiti’s history, which is one 
of colonialism and authoritarian rule. The Haitian people have been repeatedly 
stripped of their right to self-determination: first, as slaves under French 
colonialism; then, as indentured servants paying a debt to the French Republic; 
later, living under authoritarian regimes such as those of “Papa Doc” and “Baby 
Doc” Duvalier; finally, under a new form of imperialism in which NGOs take on 
roles that the Haitian government should hold, thus de-democratising and de-
politicising the development of Haiti. Each of these stages has contributed to 
Haiti’s inability to prevent the devastation of the earthquake and to manage the 
relief and recovery efforts.  
Haiti’s problems had already begun at the time of independence. In 
1804, La Perle des Antilles (the Jewel of the Caribbean) fought a bloody 
revolution to become the first black republic in the Western Hemisphere 
(Pierre-Louis, 2011, pp. 187-188). However, Haiti’s freedom came at great cost. 
Not only was its infrastructure completely destroyed by the war, but in 1825, 
when its independence was finally recognised by France, Haiti was forced to 
pay reparations to France (Fatton Jr., 2011, p. 160). During the 80 years it took to 
pay the 150 million French francs in reparations (about US$21 billion in today’s 
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money) that France had demanded, none of its tax revenue could be used to 
build schools and infrastructure (Pierre-Louis, 2011, pp. 188-189). Haiti was 
essentially trapped in a new form of colonialism, its status in relation to France 
transformed from slave to indentured servant. Scholars often attribute Haiti’s 
modern-day poverty to the decision to pay this debt to France more than a 
century ago (Pierre-Louis, 2011, p. 189). 
Post-independence, Haiti was plagued by despotism as French 
colonisers were replaced by Haitian authoritarian regimes. Most notable of 
these were the regimes of François “Papa Doc” Duvalier, who ruled from 1957 
until his death in 1971, and his Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier, who succeeded 
him until 1986 when he was overthrown by a popular uprising (Pierre-Louis, 
2011, pp. 189-190). During the dictatorships, the Haitian government invested 
very little outside of Port-au-Prince. Its rural towns served as satellites to the 
capital, much as how Haiti had once served as a satellite of the French 
Republic, and so remained in a less developed state (Frank, 1966). 
Centralisation of resources meant that Haitians were likely to find a better life 
in the capital than in rural areas, so Haitians began migrating to the city. 
Beginning during Papa Doc’s rule, Port-au-Prince, a city built to hold 250,000 
people at most, ballooned to a population of almost three million inhabitants 
(Gros, 2011, p. 141). By the time Jean-Claude Duvalier inherited power, Haiti had 
become increasingly dependent on foreign aid, as the Haitian government was 
unable to collect sufficient revenue. However, around the same time, the 
international community decided to limit aid to the Haitian government on the 
basis of claims of corruption (Pierre-Louis, 2011, pp. 189-190); according to a 
1983 World Bank report, at least 40% of aid given to the Haitian government 
could not be accounted for (Gros, 2011, p. 142).  
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Instead, aid was outsourced to NGOs, a pattern that has continued into 
the 21st century. There are currently between 10,000 and 11,000 NGOs working 
inside Haiti, an increase from 200-300 in 1984 and 800 in 1994; only 
Afghanistan has a greater number of NGOs. (Gros, 2011; Pierre-Louis, 2011; 
Fatton Jr., 2011; Bellegarde-Smith, 2011). Of these, 51% are headquartered in the 
United States (Ramachandran & Walz, 2012, p. 17). These NGOs fulfil many of 
the roles that the state should, but cannot, fulfil; though certain important 
roles—such as policing, politics, and bureaucracy—are necessarily outside of 
their scope.1 Development aid thus serves as a sort of modern-day replacement 
for the colonialism and authoritarian rule of the past, in which outside actors 
not only decided that the Haitian government was corrupt (which it may have 
been) and underdeveloped, but they also determined which projects were 
necessary in order to improve the wellbeing of the Haitian people. The 
discourse of development created a structure of paternalism, with aid agencies 
making decisions that should be made in a democratic manner by politicians, 
such as how to educate children, where and how to build infrastructure, or how 
to fix the economy. Development, then, performs all sorts of political 
operations while “depoliticising everything it touches” (Ferguson, 1990, pp. xv, 
25). Development aid also reinforced the unequal investment of the Duvaliers; 
CARE’s Food for Work programme damaged the agricultural industry by 
introducing cheaper, foreign surplus food, causing Haitian farmers to abandon 
their farmland for the city and to fall into dependency (Pierre-Louis, 2011, p. 
196). 
                                                 
1
 According to Peter Evans (1995), the roles of the state are making war, enforcing internal 
order, and economic transformation. While NGOs attempt the third role, only the state 
possesses the power to create economic policy. 
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Thus when the earthquake struck in 2010, Haiti was left unable to 
recover on its own due to policies that predate the earthquake (Lundy, 2011a). 
According to Max Weber, the purpose of the state is to protect citizens against 
certain adverse conditions for which there are not individual solutions (Gros, 
2011, p. 136). Because the Haitian government had centralised its resources 
primarily in the capital, when Port-au-Prince was destroyed the government 
was left unable to respond to the emergency and send resources from other 
parts of Haiti (Gros, 2011, p. 143). In coordinating disaster relief, governments 
are the most legitimate actor. But as the Haitian government was left unable to 
respond, the humanitarian response to the earthquake was uncoordinated. The 
coordination of the distribution of aid received by thousands of NGOs is not a 
role that any NGO possesses the capability or authority to handle; nor were 
NGOs ready to respond immediately after the disaster.  
The extreme centralisation of Haiti also contributed to the immensity of 
the disaster caused by the earthquake. The fact that most resources were spent 
on Port-au-Prince is what led to the city becoming home to nearly a third of the 
country’s population. Homes were built everywhere, from mountainsides to 
riverbeds, often by unqualified builders with disregard to building codes; the 
government did not have the resources to enforce these regulations. Patrick 
Bellegarde-Smith (2011) was correct in calling this earthquake a manmade 
disaster. While seismic activity is a natural phenomenon, the toll that it took on 
the lives of Haitians was due to human causes. 
Chapter Outline 
This chapter outline will divide my research question into three smaller 
sub-questions: How was the 2010 earthquake in Haiti reported upon by the 
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international media and by international humanitarian aid organisations? How 
were resources and personnel actually allocated in Haiti in the wake of the 
earthquake? How effective was the response, and how could data have helped 
to determine what kind of aid response was necessary? 
In the first chapter, I explore the discourses of the media and NGOs with 
regards to the disaster. Based on de Ville de Goyet’s (2008a) theory that the 
pressure of the media, rather than evidenced need, influences the direction of 
humanitarian aid, I will conduct a discourse analysis of newspapers and 
television broadcasts from donor countries regarding the earthquake and relief 
efforts. This will allow me, in the following chapter, to analyse whether there is 
a correlation between media discourses around the 2010 earthquake in Haiti 
and the humanitarian aid distribution that followed.  
The second chapter examines what actually happened during the relief 
and recovery efforts in Haiti in the wake of the 2010 earthquake in contrast to 
how the earthquake was reported internationally. In this section I discuss how 
resources were allocated; the politics of control between NGOs, IGOs, and 
governments; and how communication networks functioned between them. In 
addition to addressing questions of the kind of aid dispatched and the 
distribution of resources and personnel, I consider who determined the 
direction of aid and why they appropriated this authority. Finally, I examine the 
kind of information that was available at the time and how it was used, such as: 
how many people were affected (displaced, injured, unemployed) by the 
earthquake? How much food and water was available in Haiti and was it 
accessible? What were the medical needs of those affected by the earthquake?  
Using the advantage of hindsight, the third chapter critically examines 
the efficacy of the humanitarian aid response to the earthquake. In this section, 
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I explore what worked (and why), what could have been better, what was 
neglected (and why), and how the use of data could have helped aid 
organisations to more efficiently and effectively provide aid. In answering these 
questions, I address whose data were used (and why), what data were used (and 
why), and why data were not used in certain instances. I also discuss studies on 
aid beneficiary feedback, as the input of beneficiaries is essential to evaluating 
the efficacy of humanitarian aid. Finally, I suggest solutions for more useful 
data collection.  
This project embarks on an exploration of the use of data in determining 
the need for resources and personnel in Haiti following the earthquake in 2010, 
but it has wider implications. It is of utmost importance to question how to 
determine the needs of those affected by natural disaster. By examining the 
shortcomings in the humanitarian response to this particular natural disaster, it 
will be possible to take a more critical approach to preparedness for the next 
natural disaster. This project has relevance along several lines: it will provide an 
insight into the rationale behind disaster relief allocation, it will provide 
information on the kinds of data needed prior to dispatching international 
disaster relief and recovery aid, and it will offer some foundations upon which 
disaster recovery may be made more sustainable long-term. 
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Chapter 1. The discourses of the 
media and the earthquake in Haiti 
I think Haiti is a place that suffers so much from neglect that 
people only want to hear about it when it’s at its extreme. And 
that’s what they end up knowing about it. 
- Edwidge Danticat, Haitian-American author 
Given the billions of dollars of aid in the form of food, water, supplies, 
and workers that flowed into Haiti after the earthquake, it seems inconceivable 
that the needs of those affected remained largely unmet. Yet in the wake of the 
2015 earthquakes in Nepal, there have been a number of news stories concerned 
with learning lessons from Haiti’s mismatched and misguided aid effort. 
Newspaper editorials suggested that media coverage of natural disasters often 
guides aid to the wrong places (Katz, 2015) and that humanitarian aid workers 
often have no idea whether their work is effective (Kirsch, 2015). This is not a 
new concept, but is in line with Claude de Ville de Goyet’s (2008a, p. 53) 
suggestion that the priority given to speed over information in urgent 
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situations means that supply and personnel distribution is largely driven by the 
discursive framework of the media rather than by evidenced need.  
Based on de Ville de Goyet’s assertions that the pressure and rhetoric of 
the international media has a greater impact on the flow of humanitarian aid 
than does data-based evidence of need, I will conduct a discourse analysis in 
this chapter that examines the language used in several major newspapers and 
television news channels from the United States and Canada, where the 
greatest amount of donations originated (Ramachandran & Walz, 2012, p. 6), 
with regards to the earthquake. The purpose of this analysis is to explore how 
this discourse regarding the earthquake and the subsequent relief efforts in 
Haiti compares with the actual allocation of resources and personnel, and with 
evidenced need. I hypothesise that there will be a greater correlation between 
the discourses of the media and the aid received than between the evidenced 
need and the aid received or between the media discourse and the evidenced 
need.  
Literature Review 
Existing academic literature on the media’s coverage of the earthquake 
indicates that media narratives were often misinformed. Garvey Lundy (2011a, 
p. 128) states that media coverage of the Haitian earthquake was full of 
speculation, misinformation, and racial caricature, and adds that while experts 
were sometimes called upon to comment, they were given inadequate time, 
often under one minute, to explain the situation, even on twenty-four hour 
news networks. Other academics noted that the earthquake coverage in 
American media focused more on Americans than Haitians, often portraying 
Haitians and Haitian culture as inferior. 
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Patrick Bellegarde-Smith (2011, pp. 267-272) discusses several 
problematic issues with the Western media’s coverage of the 2010 earthquake in 
Haiti. One is the presence of a narrative of cultural inferiority. Bellegarde-Smith 
compares the discourse of New York Times columnist David Brooks to Times 
narratives of “black savages” in the late 19th century and of “tribal rule and 
superstition” the 1950s. After the earthquake, Brooks blamed the “progress-
resistant” Haitian culture for the destruction caused by the earthquake and 
suggested that “intrusive paternalism” is the only solution to Haiti’s problems 
(p. 268). Bellegarde-Smith argues that Brooks is masking racism with 
culturalism, citing the fact that the arguments that have been made for 
generations have remained the same but have simply substituted race for 
culture.  
Murali Balaji (2011) takes a linguistic approach to argue that the words 
and images presented in the media following the 2010 earthquake, as in other 
disasters, were racialized. The coverage of the earthquake was characterised by 
words such as ‘chaos’, ‘dysfunction’, ‘violence’, and ‘hopelessness’, designed to 
evoke pity (and consequently power over the pitied) rather than empathy 
toward the black victims (Balaji, 2011, p. 51). This racism was further manifested 
in an expectation of violence, which was expressed almost hopefully by the 
media; several reports made speculative comments such as “Haitians were 
expected to riot because of the delays in providing them with water and food 
after the earthquake, hence the delay in providing them with water and food” 
(Bellegarde-Smith, 2011, pp. 271-272). However, they did not riot. Bellegarde-
Smith compares this to media expectations that black people in New Orleans 
would riot following Hurricane Katrina in 2005. 
The use of data in international humanitarian responses 
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Another issue discussed by both Balaji and Bellegarde-Smith is how the 
story of the earthquake was altered by Western media, which focused on the 
generosity of American and European NGOs and individuals as the subjects of 
stories, while Haitian earthquake victims were merely the targets of their good 
deeds (Balaji, 2011, pp. 55-57). While the first foreign responders to the 
earthquake were Cuban, not American, this was not acknowledged by the U.S. 
media. In fact, the U.S. media misidentified Cuban doctors as Spanish; likewise, 
light-skinned Haitian doctors were misidentified as French (Bellegarde-Smith, 
2011, pp. 269-270). Bellegarde-Smith notes that when the U.S. military arrived in 
Port-au-Prince, they took control of the airport against the wishes of the 
Haitian government, who was unable to respond. The United States military 
blocked Venezuelan (and sometimes even French) attempts to deliver aid, as it 
controlled the only major airport in Haiti (Bellegarde-Smith, 2011, pp. 269-270). 
Meanwhile, the U.S. military was presented in the American media as the 
coordinator of international humanitarian relief aid.  
This west-as-rescuer discourse was also present in the narrative that 
surrounded “quake babies”; Bellegarde-Smith notes that the Canadian media 
presented American and Canadian “adoptions” of Haitian babies as rescues, 
when in fact thousands of Haitian children were taken without knowledge of 
the location or wellbeing of their parents (Bellegarde-Smith, 2011, pp. 270-271). 
Most notably, Laura Silsby of New Life, an Idaho-based Christian group, was 
arrested by Haitian authorities for kidnapping and trafficking Haitian children 
under the guise of ‘the Lord’s plan’ to rescue them. Many in the media 
defended her actions. Balaji also notes that while self-congratulatory stories 
focused on the donors, they never showed how the donations were actually 
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used by the victims, citing the fact that many donations are often of little use to 
disaster victims (2011, pp. 58-63). 
One prominent narrative present in the media following the earthquake 
was that of American Christian televangelist Pat Robertson (and other 
Protestants), who blamed the earthquake on a “pact with the devil” allegedly 
made by the Haitian people in exchange for freedom from French slave-owners 
in the early 1800s. Jean-Germain Gros (2011, pp. 132-133) notes that the majority 
of Haitians are Christians (albeit mixed with some Vodou influence) and 
dismisses Reverend Robertson’s theory as bigotry and theological revisionism. 
Felix Germain (2011, p. 250) adds that blaming the destruction, injury, and loss 
of life caused by the earthquake and other natural disasters on Haitian Vodou 
conveniently ignore the role that the US, France, and other countries play in 
Haiti’s economic dependency. He also notes that the Western media selectively 
displayed the Christian faith of many earthquake survivors, displaying Haitians 
singing hymns and praying, while largely ignoring the survival of Houngans 
and Mambos of Vodou (Germain, 2011, p. 255). This is ironic given that Vodou 
in Haiti is typically an obsession in Hollywood and the media. 
Media coverage of the earthquake was not only misinformed, but at 
times deliberately so. Speculation on violence suggests a desire to confirm 
preconceived views about Haitians held by the American and Canadian publics. 
Blaming a “pact with the devil” for the earthquake pushes blame onto the 
Haitian people, undermining the ability of the public to empathise. Meanwhile, 
misrepresentation of the needs of the Haitian people led supposedly well-
meaning groups to traffic children out of Haiti under the guise of rescuing 
them. Finally, paternalistic representations of Haiti as a nation that cannot care 
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for itself allowed the U.S. military to present its takeover of Port-au-Prince’s 
airport as a rescue story. 
Methodology and Method 
I will begin the discourse analysis by gathering information about the 
producer of each newspaper or television broadcast, including political 
position, target audience, genre, and layout. I will then analyse how specific 
words and images are used, and the ideas with which these words and images 
are associated, coding data into categories based on the themes that emerge 
from the media. It is important to pay particularly close attention to the images 
and title, as these have a particularly strong impact on the audience (Mautner, 
2008, p. 38). Most importantly, I will note any calls to action or references to 
specific needs made by the news report, as these would be most likely to 
influence actions taken by individuals and organisations if de Ville de Goyet 
(2008a, p. 53) is indeed correct in his assertion that aid and supply distribution 
is driven by media pressure. 
It is important to note a limitation of this type of research: this discourse 
analysis is unable to show what readers of these newspapers and viewers of 
television broadcasts thought or whether readers and viewers responded in the 
way suggested. This study will merely attempt to gauge whether there is a 
greater correlation between need identified by the media and where aid was 
actually dispatched, or between need identified by data and where aid was 
dispatched. Thus this research is not meant to be explanatory, but descriptive. 
Even if a correlation is found, it does not necessarily mean that the media was 
the cause of, or a factor in, the mismatching of aid; in fact, it is entirely possible 
that a confounding factor played a role in what journalists believed to be 
22 Patrick Linton 
 
necessary and in how earthquake relief aid was distributed in Haiti. However, if 
a correlation is found, a quantitative study looking into the causality would 
provide a compelling direction for future research. The presence of any 
discrepancies should be taken into account both in humanitarian aid 
evaluation and in future planning. 
For this analysis, after reviewing approximately 150 news reports and 
tracking themes, 22 news reports were chosen from eight American and five 
Canadian news media outlets, for a total of fifteen American reports and seven 
Canadian reports. These twenty-two were chosen because they were 
representative of the media outlets, topics, and tone of the greater set of media 
reports. Due to syndication, reports by wire services such as AP and Reuters 
might be published on 35 different news sites. To account for this, news reports 
that were very similar to others were not included. The news media outlets 
chosen included eight newspapers (New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Los 
Angeles Times, New York Daily News, New York Post, Toronto Star, Globe 
and Mail, and La Presse), four television news stations (Fox News, CNN, CBC 
News, and CTV News), and one radio station (NPR News). These sources were 
selected because they are among the most read, watched, and listened to news 
outlets in the United States and Canada. They include a mixture of right- 
leaning (such as Fox News, the Wall Street Journal and New York Post) and 
left-leaning media (such as the New York Times and Los Angeles Times). 
Other popular news outlets such as the Washington Post, USA Today, 
MSNBC, and Le Journal de Montréal were not included either because of a lack 
of earthquake coverage or archives that were not easily accessible. 
The media reports were selected conducting a Google search with the 
terms "Haiti earthquake" (or "Haïti séisme" for news sources in French), 
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restricted to dates between 12 January 2010 and 12 February 2010, the time 
during which most articles about the earthquake were written, and restricted to 
the domain name of the news source (e.g. "Haiti earthquake site:nytimes.com 
daterange:2455209-2455240"). From these results, media reports were selected 
based on their relevance to the earthquake and relief efforts. Selecting first-
page results from Google ensured that the most widely-viewed and widely-
shared reports from each news source are included in the study, rather than 
reports that may have received a limited audience. A limitation to this method 
is that the results are restricted by the Google algorithm, whose inner workings 
are not open to the public, though as Google is the most-used search engine in 
the United States and Canada, this is likely to mirror the way in which news 
was accessed and shared by readers. Another limitation to this method is that 
media outlets may have made some pages unindexable. Finally, 24-hour news 
networks such as Fox News and CNN do not make all reports available online 
in the format in which they were initially presented. 
These news reports were uploaded into the NVIVO software and tagged 
with the emergent themes found in the reports. This software was used because 
it allows for coding and tagging of text, images, and other multimedia used in 
qualitative research. 
Findings 
Within the American and Canadian news reports, I identified six 
emergent themes: the material needs of the survivors of the earthquake; 
logistical problems encountered in distributing aid among the earthquake 
survivors, either because of the damage caused by the earthquake, the 
bottleneck created by the volume of international aid suddenly flowing into the 
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country, or by pre-existing infrastructural problems; corruption or the lack of 
ability to govern; reports of looting and of the potential for violence; stories 
that present Americans or Canadians as heroes in Haiti and stories of how the 
earthquake affected Americans or Canadians in Haiti; and religion. Most of 
these themes point either directly or indirectly to perceived needs within Haiti. 
Reports of the lack of water, food, and shelter suggest the need for particular 
aid supplies to be brought to Haiti from donor countries. Reports of logistical 
problems suggest the need for humanitarian aid experts to be brought in to 
assist in untangling the mess in Haiti. A focus on corruption and poor 
governance in the Haitian government suggests a need for an alternative 
decision-making body for aid coordination. Stories of looting and the potential 
for violence suggest the need for order in the form of an outside policing body. 
Material needs 
Most media reporting in the aftermath of the earthquake included either 
explicit or implicit descriptions of the material needs of the people in Port-au-
Prince. Of those needs, water and food were mentioned most frequently, 
appearing in two-thirds of the news reports that explicitly stated a material 
need (Woods, 2010; Pasztor, et al., 2010; De Córdoba & Luhnow, 2010; CNN, 
2010b; Schapiro, 2010; Romero, 2010; Fox News, 2010a; CTV News, 2010). 
However, by 27 January US military officials were reporting that food was no 
longer a critical need, stating that it could be found in markets (Burnett, 2010). 
Another frequently mentioned material need was medical supplies and doctors, 
mentioned in one-half of all reports that explicitly stated a material need 
(Woods, 2010; CTV News, 2010; De Córdoba & Luhnow, 2010; CNN, 2010b; 
Schapiro, 2010; Romero, 2010). CNN (2010b) included a direct appeal from 
former US President Bill Clinton, the UN Special Envoy to Haiti, highlighting 
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the need for donations to organisations supplying food, water, shelter, and 
medical supplies. Other material needs mentioned in news reports were shelter 
(CNN, 2010b; CBC News, 2010), basic sanitation (Woods, 2010; Schapiro, 2010; 
Romero, 2010), electricity (Pasztor, et al., 2010; Paperny & Ibbitson, 2010; CNN, 
2010b; Schapiro, 2010; Wilkinson, 2010), communications infrastructure 
(Paperny & Ibbitson, 2010; Wilkinson, 2010), body bags (Fox News, 2010a), 
helicopters (CTV News, 2010; CNN, 2010b), aircraft fuel (Pasztor, et al., 2010), 
and heavy machinery (CNN, 2010b). 
Media reports also reported heavily on the types of material aid flowing 
into earthquake-affected areas. Among the material aid distributed in Haiti 
were food and water (CTV News, 2010; Romero, 2010; Fox News, 2010a; Smith, 
2010), medical supplies (CTV News, 2010; Romero, 2010), women’s sanitary 
products (Smith, 2010), helicopters (Fox News, 2010a), and heavy machinery 
(Fox News, 2010a). 
Logistics 
Many news reports noted problems in the distribution of aid resources 
to those affected by the earthquake. These included titles such as “Clogged 
airport, ruined seaport delay aid after Haiti earthquake” (Pasztor, et al., 2010) 
and “Good intentions gone wrong” (Waldie, 2010). Approximately a third 
mentioned problems in the distribution of aid resources (CNN, 2010a; Woods, 
2010; Pasztor, et al., 2010; CNN, 2010b; CBC News, 2010; Fox News, 2010a; 
Burnett, 2010; Waldie, 2010). One NPR News report stated that “information is 
confusing and contradictory in post-earthquake Haiti” and claimed that there 
were, in fact, sufficient water and medical supplies, but that the problem was in 
the distribution of these resources (Burnett, 2010). One article in The Globe and 
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Mail begins with the frustrations of a Canadian woman who noticed nearly 100 
pallets loaded with bottled water sitting idly on the tarmac of the airport in 
Port-au-Prince while hundreds of thousands of earthquake-affected Haitians 
waited thirsty (Waldie, 2010). Anecdotes such as this were typical of news 
reports involving logistics. 
Areas in which the media suggested there were logistics and aid 
distribution problems were water (CNN, 2010a; Waldie, 2010), food (Fox News, 
2010a; Burnett, 2010), and medical supplies (CNN, 2010a; Woods, 2010). Reasons 
listed for these problems included clogged runways at the airport (Woods, 2010; 
Pasztor, et al., 2010; Waldie, 2010; CBC News, 2010; Fox News, 2010a), a lack of 
coordination between aid agencies (Waldie, 2010; Fox News, 2010a; Waldie, 
2010), the destroyed seaport (Woods, 2010; Pasztor, et al., 2010; CBC News, 
2010), blocked roads (Woods, 2010), corruption (Burnett, 2010; Woods, 2010), 
and the Haitian government’s inability to coordinate aid (Waldie, 2010; Woods, 
2010). 
Governance 
Corruption in Haiti and the government’s incapacity to coordinate aid 
were oft-mentioned themes in news reports involving Haiti. One editorialist 
recommended that the United States government should not provide aid to the 
Haitian government because it would be subsidising Haitian corruption 
(Whiton, 2010). In his editorial, former US Department of State official 
Christian Whiton (2010) pointed out that Haiti was ranked as one of the world’s 
most corrupt countries by Transparency International, and suggested that since 
the US had no interests in Haiti and no fault in its poverty, the US government 
had no reason to be in Haiti. 
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Other media reports suggested that the key to successful disaster relief is 
a strong national government that can coordinate aid, but that Haiti lacked this 
(Woods, 2010; Waldie, 2010). Any capacity that the Haitian government had 
prior to the earthquake had been diminished when its ministerial headquarters 
were destroyed. Instead, they suggested, NGOs had taken charge of the 
country, which was problematic because of the lack of a single, central 
coordinating force for the distribution of aid (Waldie, 2010). 
Violence 
Much media attention was paid to earthquake survivors who searched 
for food in the rubble of supermarkets and other places of business, calling 
them “looters” (CNN, 2010a; Montero, 2010; Fox News, 2010a; Smith, 2010). 
News reports had titles such as “’A frenzy of looting’ seen in Haiti’s capital” 
(CNN, 2010a), “Desperados are spreading fear in quake-ravaged Haiti” 
(Montero, 2010), “Haiti nears breaking point as aid is snarled, looters roam” 
(Fox News, 2010a), and “Mob justice in Haiti” (Smith, 2010). Reporters, such as 
CNN’s Anderson Cooper, speculated that looters were stealing items in order to 
sell them later (CNN, 2010a). Early reports had incorrectly stated that looters 
had cleared out the UN World Food Programme’s long-term food storage from 
its Port-au-Prince warehouse, rendering the WFP unable to distribute food. 
Corrections showed this to be mostly untrue (Fox News, 2010a). This was met 
with editorials demanding that the media stop calling earthquake victims 
“looters,” drawing comparisons between the media response to the Haitian 
earthquake and that of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans, where black people 
taking food from flooded supermarkets were said to be looting while white 
people doing the same were ‘finding food’ (Charles, 2010). 
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Reports of looting were often coupled with reports of the potential for 
an outbreak of violence, especially over a lack of food or water (De Córdoba & 
Luhnow, 2010; Fox News, 2010a), or with reports of news correspondents 
hearing gunshots in the distance (Montero, 2010; CNN, 2010b). One article 
described people as “almost fighting” over water distributed by aid workers 
(Fox News, 2010a). It is worth noting that the media that dedicated the most 
time and space to looting and potential violence were the Murdoch-owned, 
conservative news broadcaster Fox News and the Murdoch-owned, 
conservative newspaper The New York Post. However, with one exception of 
“mob justice” wherein a group beat a thief with a stick (Smith, 2010), none of 
the news reports listed any actual eyewitness accounts of violence.  
America and Canada 
Within the American media there was significant focus on Americans. 
This was divided between stories of the experiences of American citizens who 
survived the earthquake in Haiti (McKinley, Jr. & Skipp, 2010) and coverage of 
the generosity of the American people and government (Pasztor, et al., 2010; 
Montero, 2010; Whiton, 2010; McKinley, Jr. & Skipp, 2010; CNN, 2010b; Fox 
News, 2010a). Six of the 22 media reports included in this study included direct 
mention of American aid (not including mentions of aid by US-based NGOs). 
Americans, both earthquake survivors and those who had come to provide 
emergency aid, were generally portrayed as heroes coming to the rescue of 
hopeless Haitians. A Fox News (2010a) report, entitled “Haiti nears breaking 
point as aid is snarled, looters roam” repeatedly jumped back and forth 
between stories of Haitian earthquake victims looting for food and stories of 
how the United States government was coordinating aid and providing food, 
water, and security, portraying Americans as saviours and Haitians as savages. 
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Likewise, the Canadian media focused on the generosity of Canadians. 
One article in the Quebec-based, Canadian newspaper La Presse, entitled 
“Haïti: les Canadiens, les plus généreux?” [“Haiti: Canadians, the most 
generous?”] highlighted the fact that Canadians gave an average of $7.51 per 
person (figures in Canadian dollars) compared to an average of $2.56 per person 
in the United States and $0.73 per person in France (Dion-Viens, 2010). 
One strange event that garnered media attention was the claim by 
Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez that the earthquake could be blamed on a 
United States military experiment. Chavez argued that the United States was 
testing a system that could create “weather anomalies” such as earthquakes, 
hurricanes, droughts, and floods, and that the US was using this as an excuse 
for its military occupation of Haiti (Fox News, 2010b). 
Religion 
Hugo Chavez was not the only public figure to cast blame for the seismic 
events that occurred in Haiti. Pat Robertson, a prominent evangelical leader 
and host of The 700 Club, suggested that the earthquake was God’s 
punishment for the Haitian slave rebellion over two-hundred years ago. 
Robertson claimed that the reason for Haiti’s poverty and natural disasters is 
that the Haitian people made a “pact with the devil” in order to secure their 
independence from French colonisers over two-hundred years ago (CNN, 
2010c). Other stories involving religion focused on the faith of the Haitian 
people and its significant role in their lives, especially in the wake of the 
earthquake. They portrayed Haitians singing hymns (Montero, 2010) and 
praying (CBC News, 2010) or feeling abandoned by God (Charles, 2010). 
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However, none of the news reports analysed in this study made any mention of 
the Vodou religion. 
Discussion and analysis 
Existing scholarship on the media’s representation of the earthquake in 
Haiti was reflected and reinforced by my findings. There was a large media 
focus on poor logistics and Haiti’s lack of ability to govern. There was also a 
significant focus on violence and looting, despite the lack of actual occurrences. 
These provided the international community with a rhetorical ‘probable cause’ 
to effectively take over the Haitian state and occupy Haiti under humanitarian 
auspices. The media also prioritised American and Canadian experiences and 
interests over Haitian ones. One theme identified in the literature review, the 
adoption/kidnapping of “quake babies” was not found in this study. However, 
this study is concerned with some main themes and is not representative of the 
full range of topics covered by the media in relation to the earthquake. 
News reports on the needs of post-earthquake Haiti were rather 
straightforward. However, they focused primarily on short-term needs, rather 
than long-term recovery. This is likely due to the short time frame of this study, 
which focuses on the first month after the earthquake. While they did at times 
identify the source of requests for certain supplies [e.g. Haitian President Rene 
Preval requested help clearing streets and Bill Clinton requested food, water, 
shelter, and medical supplies (CNN, 2010b)], there was no information about 
whether surveys or needs assessments had been carried out, or how sources 
had identified particular needs. Certain needs tended to be taken by the media 
as given, while logistical problems were emphasised as the main problem in aid 
distribution.  
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Widespread belief in the Haitian government’s inability to govern had 
implications beyond the media audiences to the international community. 
American and Canadian journalists reported at length on corruption, 
inefficiency, and a lack of capacity in the Haitian state. The presentation of a 
foreign country as unable to govern itself is perhaps likely to elicit sympathy 
toward efforts to assist that country. For instance, prior to (and during) the war 
in Iraq in 2003, reports of human rights atrocities committed by Saddam 
Hussein’s regime proliferated in the Western media. Human rights violations, 
widely considered a result of poor governance, allowed popular support (by 
both conservatives and liberals) for invasion when the threat of weapons of 
mass destruction was not sufficiently shown. Similarly, media portrayal of a 
Haitian state that could not care for itself helped create conditions by which 
Western support for governments and NGOs to enter Haiti and take control of 
institutions formerly in the hands of the Haitian government could be 
rhetorically justified. The United States military’s takeover of the Port-au-
Prince airport was uninvited by the Haitian government, yet was not protested 
by the American public. It was, however, seen by the French government as an 
intrusion (Bellegarde-Smith, 2011, pp. 269-270). Similarly, unconfirmed (and 
later shown to be incorrect) reports of looting and violence may have been 
related to the United States military’s decision to send thirty thousand troops 
to Haiti after the earthquake (Ramachandran & Walz, 2012, p. 9). Therefore, 
rather than allowing the Haitian government to direct the flow of aid according 
to its own priorities, it was the international community who decided how aid 
should be managed and how Haiti should be rebuilt. 
The literature review was accurate regarding representations of 
Americans and Canadians in Haiti. Balaji (2011) wrote that the media focused 
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on black, Haitian victims and American saviours. The Fox News (2010a) report 
that oscillated back and forth between Haitian “looters” and American aid was 
a perfect example of this. Also of note were an American article telling the story 
of an American volunteer injured in the quake (McKinley, Jr. & Skipp, 2010) and 
a Canadian article that suggested that Canadians were the world’s most 
generous people (Dion-Viens, 2010). The fact that each national media focused 
on its own country is particularly significant because it could foster popular 
support for foreign aid to Haiti; when Canadians see themselves as more 
generous, they may be more likely to support Canadian government aid to 
Haiti in order to maintain a reputation of generosity (Bekkers & Wiepking, 2011, 
pp. 936-941). However, while the La Presse article found that Canadians gave, 
on average, more than people from other countries, it failed to mention that 
the most of the aid given by Canada went to Canadian companies and was 
spent on Canadian survivors (Bellegarde-Smith, 2011, p. 266). Similarly, the 
American press dedicated much space to profiling the experiences of 
Americans that had either been injured in the earthquake or were helping with 
the recovery effort. Seeing other Americans in Haiti made the situation more 
relatable for Americans than it would have been had the stories only focused on 
the lives of Haitians; people who can relate to the subjects of news stories are 
more likely to continue reading or watching (Balaji, 2011, pp. 58-59), and might 
be more likely to support aid to Haiti (Bekkers & Wiepking, 2011, pp. 938-940).  
Religion was often mentioned in media coverage of the earthquake, as 
Bellegarde-Smith, Gros, Asante, and Germain have suggested. However, while 
the media’s coverage of Pat Robertson’s statements about Vodou and the 
Haitian revolution was discussed by many academics, it did not dominate the 
media as suggested by Gros and Bellegarde-Smith. In fact, neither of the 
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narratives discussed by Gros received a great deal of media attention. Although 
Christianity was mentioned in multiple news reports (including mentions of 
Haitian Christians’ faith and of American and Canadian missionaries), none of 
the news reports in this study mentioned Vodou, a religion of great historic and 
modern importance to Haiti, with the exception of Pat Robertson’s statements. 
Conclusion 
This discourse analysis found six emergent themes in the media 
coverage of Haiti: the Haitian people’s needs, logistical problems in distributing 
aid, poor governance in Haiti, the expectation of violence, a focus on non-
Haitians in Haiti, and religion (Christianity, not Vodou). It is possible that 
misconceptions about the disaster spread by the media, coupled with over-
coverage of certain aspects may have contributed to the mismatched aid 
response in Haiti. However, it is equally possible that the media portrayal of 
Haiti may have been influenced by the aid response in Haiti, or that both were 
influenced by some external factor. The following chapter will discuss what 
actually happened in the wake of the earthquake, examining both the 
evidenced need in Haiti, and the kind of data the international humanitarian 
community collected and/or utilised in the relief and recovery efforts. 
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Chapter 2. The allocation of resources 
and personnel after the earthquake 
“True compassion is not flinging a coin to a beggar; it 
understands that the edifice that produces beggars is in need of 
restructuring” 
- Juan Arévalo, former Guatemalan president 
Following the 2010 earthquake, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee 
(IASC), founded in 1992 by UN resolutions A/RES/46/182 and A/RES/48/57 as 
the primary mechanism for coordinating humanitarian assistance, conducted a 
multi-cluster Rapid Initial Needs Assessment for Haiti (RINAH) between 23 
January and 06 February (ACAPS, 2010). The report did not give information on 
a detailed, disaggregated level, such as the individual- or household-level, but 
on a per-camp level (e.g. 36% of sites within Port-au-Prince reported outbreaks 
of influenza). The report noted that temporary shelters provided little privacy 
or protection from the elements (Stoianova, 2010, p. 11), that access to water 
was difficult and time consuming, that food prices had increased, and that most 
Haitians ate fewer meals per day than they had prior to the earthquake. The 
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report also suggested that food availability should be better adapted to the 
needs of vulnerable populations in particular, such as children, the elderly, and 
the disabled (ACAPS, 2010, pp. 37-38, 41-43, 46, 50-57). There were high rates of 
flu, diarrhoea, and malaria (yet few households possessed mosquito nets); 
access to medical care was especially difficult outside of Port-au-Prince 
(Stoianova, 2010, p. 11). 
While the RINAH report focused on the immediate needs of Haitians 
after the earthquake, academic literature focused more on the long-term needs 
of Haiti. François Pierre-Louis (2011, pp. 199-200) suggested that Haiti’s biggest 
post-earthquake need was the coordination of the distribution of aid. Haiti’s 
NGOs lacked the ability to coordinate disaster relief needs such as the 
establishment of order, the distribution of food, and ensuring citizens’ safety. 
This, he argued, was because outside neoliberal influences on Haiti had 
encouraged the minimisation of government (p. 198) in favour of the private 
and non-profit sectors, leading to a weakened state unable to respond to 
national emergencies. 
 Robert Fatton Jr. (2011, pp. 171-173) argued that for real recovery to 
occur, humanitarian aid must focus on the long-term needs of Haiti. He 
suggested a focus on infrastructural development, agricultural transformation, 
and food self-sufficiency in order to create employment, alleviate poverty, and 
bridge the wealth gap. He also suggested that this must be led by government 
in a democratic manner, rather than by NGOs, as they are undemocratic, not 
accountable to the Haitian public, and infringe on the sovereignty of the 
Haitian state when they make decisions without public consultation. Fatton 
argued that narratives of the corrupt nature of Haitian government, whether 
true or false, have caused aid to Haiti to flow into NGOs rather than in the form 
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of assistance to the government. Reliance on NGOs has led to further 
urbanisation of Haiti and its dependence on imports for food (pp. 173-175). 
Shifting foreign aid to the government rather than NGOs could strengthen the 
Haitian government to the point that it would be capable of coordinating 
development. 
In this chapter, I will examine the aid that was dispatched in Haiti by the 
international community (food, water, medical care, security, etc), in relation 
to evidenced need (that is, compared to available data) and to the various 
discourses of the media. I will discuss where and how aid was distributed in 
Haiti, as well as the problem of organisations failing to maintain accurate 
records. I will also discuss how the decision-making process left the Haitian 
government essentially disempowered. Finally, I will examine the amount and 
nature of data that were actually available at the time in relation to these issues. 
Aid was primarily distributed in Port-au-Prince, largely ignoring other 
cities and towns affected by the earthquake and leading to discrepancies in 
unmet needs. The humanitarian aid that was disbursed was distributed at 
temporary settlement camps in and around Port-au-Prince. Vulnerable 
populations such as children and the elderly were generally not prioritised in 
the distribution of aid.  
Responses to the Haitian government’s plan for recovery indicate the 
influence of funding source on aid distribution and the associated undermining 
of governmental authority. Several countries and intergovernmental 
organisations pledged donations to Haiti in an emergency appeal held at the 
United Nations in March 2010, where the Haitian government presented a 
hopeful budget detailing how it would like to proceed with the recovery 
process. However, donor countries and intergovernmental organisations 
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donated funds to specific parts of the budget, far exceeding the requested 
amount in some areas, and coming far short of what was required in other 
areas. As Haiti relied on the international community to provide the disaster 
relief and recovery aid it needed, this response of donations-with-conditions 
meant that the international community essentially decided how aid would be 
distributed in Haiti. 
Outside the government’s requests, insufficient data regarding the needs 
of the Haitian people characterised the recovery process. The RINAH report 
provided information about initial needs in Haiti, but due to a “lack of 
understanding of partners,” “organisational difficulties,” and “security 
restrictions,” it was too little and too late (Rencoret, et al., 2010, p. 25). There 
was even less information available regarding the aid distributed. Country-wide 
reports, such as those conducted by UN agencies, contained seemingly 
conflicting information. Reports by NGOs used measures that presented the 
NGO’s work in a positive light in order to please donors, and lacked more 
comprehensive indicators. Even where post-earthquake data were available, 
baseline data from before the earthquake were unavailable, making comparison 
impossible. 
What kind of aid was dispatched? 
It is difficult to estimate exactly how much and what kind of aid was 
dispatched in Haiti. Most of the dispatched aid was distributed in the 500+ 
temporary settlement camps. This is especially noticeable in the RINAH report, 
which differentiated aid provided to camps and non-camp locations. One such 
distinction is apparent in terms of access to protected water sources. While 72% 
of water sources in camps were protected, only 47% of water sources in non-
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camp locations were protected (Stoianova, 2010, p. 11). However, camps did not 
always keep accurate records and unsolicited goods and individuals unaffiliated 
with NGOs could not be accurately tracked. In addition, most NGOs in Haiti 
were not registered with the government and did not keep full information on 
their work. Much of the untraceable aid distribution took place in the early 
stages of the relief effort, in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake. In 
contrast, there is more data available regarding the aid given by governments 
and intergovernmental organisations.  
Unlike in Guatemala, where all disaster relief aid organisations are 
required to register all of their disaster relief supplies with the logistics support 
system or be denied customs clearance (Amin, 2008, p. 12; de Ville de Goyet, 
2008b, pp. 83-84), the 10,000+ NGOs working in Haiti seemingly kept little 
record of supplies and workers. Moreover, thousands of individuals unaffiliated 
with any organisation sent supplies (or themselves), unsolicited, to assist in the 
relief effort. Unsorted, unsolicited supplies occupied valuable space and added 
to the logistical problem when there was no one to coordinate distribution of 
those supplies once they had arrived in Port-au-Prince (Pierre-Louis, 2011, pp. 
199-200). The needs of unaffiliated, though well-meaning, individuals 
compounded the housing shortage that already existed in Port-au-Prince due to 
the earthquake (Sauer, et al., 2014, pp. 65-66). 
According to the secretary-general’s report on the United Nations 
Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) to the Security Council 
(S/2010/200), UNOCHA reported that as of April 2010, three months after the 
earthquake, 376,000 tarpaulins and 45,000 family-sized tents had been 
distributed by various organisations as temporary housing for Haitians living in 
camps. Also distributed were hygiene products, kitchen equipment, ropes, 
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blankets, and mosquito nets. This accounted for 90% of those in need (p. 3). 
Three and a half million Haitians had received food assistance from the World 
Food Programme and its partners, 4 million litres of drinking water had been 
distributed and 5,347 latrines had been installed (p. 3). The World Health 
Organisation and the Pan-American Health Organisation deployed 60 medical 
personnel to provide medical services and vaccinations to 300,000 Haitians (p. 
3).  
The 2010 United Nations report Haiti: 6 months after reported that as of 
the time of the report, a further 257,000 tarpaulins and 25,000 family-sized 
tents had been distributed (p. 5). In addition, over three thousand traditional 
shelters had been built (with another 122,000 planned) (p. 5). More than 
916,000 vaccines had been administered, 345,000 boxes of essential medicines 
had been distributed, 4,000 amputations had been carried out, and 2,500 units 
of blood had been imported (p. 9). Within the first two months after the 
earthquake, 18,700 metric tonnes of food had been distributed, and 87,500 
Haitians were enrolled in “Food for Work” programmes2 (p. 13). 1.2 million 
Haitians received five litres of water per day from the WASH cluster (p. 25). 
Additional supplies included 1,300 trucks driven from the Dominican Republic 
(p. 29); 1,800 tonnes of seeds and 87,500 hand tools for farmers (p. 33); 1,600 
school tents for 200,000 students (p. 15); training for 2,300 teachers and 3,000 
education personnel (p. 15); 8,500 peacekeepers (p. 35), and 2,775 police officers 
(p. 35). The peacekeepers distributed food and water, removed debris, and 
paved roads (p. 35). 
                                                 
2
 The 2011 United Nations Development Programme report Haiti: 1 year later reports that 
240,000 Haitians were employed by UNDP and WFP in “Cash for Work” or “Food for Work” 
programmes (United Nations Development Programme, 2011, p. 6). 
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Following the earthquake, there was an overemphasis on security. One-
half of the United States government’s aid went to sustaining the thirty-
thousand American troops that arrived, uninvited, during the response to the 
earthquake (Ramachandran & Walz, 2012, p. 9; Bellegarde-Smith, 2011, p. 266). 
The United States was not unique in this regard; of the relief funding from all 
donors, 39% went to the donor’s own military (Ramachandran & Walz, 2012, p. 
9). Although crime tends to decrease after a major disaster, contrary to popular 
belief, the time and resources that could have been spent on rescue and 
medical relief are often instead spent on excessive security (Benjamin, et al., 
2011, p. 314). The governmental focus on security matches the media’s focus on 
violence, as referenced in the previous chapter, where American and Canadian 
media spoke of looters, violence, and gunshots. 
How was aid distributed? 
Despite the fact that over $6 billion in aid had been distributed in Haiti 
by 2012 (Ramachandran & Walz, 2012, pp. 5-7) and earthquake damages and 
losses were estimated at $7.8 billion (United Nations Development Programme, 
2011, p. 2), Haiti has not recovered as fully as might be expected. Instead, aid 
distribution was uneven. Aid was concentrated, leaving large areas of affected 
Haitians without assistance. Aid was also distributed haphazardly, without 
regard to special needs groups, such as the elderly. Aid was also distributed 
selectively to contractors from the donors’ own countries, rather than to the 
Haitian government, leaving the Haitian economy unstimulated after the 
earthquake. This is especially significant because Haitians wanted jobs, income, 
and access to credit more than they wanted food (Kirsch, et al., 2012a, pp. 85-
86). 
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In addition to Port-au-Prince, the earthquake destroyed Léogâne, 
Gressier, Petit-Goâve, Grand-Goâve, and Jacmel (Benjamin, et al., 2011, p. 307). 
However, aid was primarily distributed in the capital (Altay & Labonte, 2014, p. 
S60). Areas outside of Port-au-Prince, and even some areas within it, were 
neglected. This was largely for logistical reasons, as those areas were more 
difficult to access due to debris and road conditions.  However, centralised 
earthquake relief matched the centralised nature of the Haitian state and 
replicated its problems. 
Aid was also often distributed without prioritising certain groups, such 
as the pregnant, elderly, or disabled, over others (Altay & Labonte, 2014, p. S63). 
Aid workers argued that this was because almost everyone had similar needs. 
However, this could neither be proved nor disproved, as there was a lack of 
accessible collected data. Organisations such as the British Red Cross and 
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) did not prioritise data collection in their 
camps, claiming that lifesaving activities must take priority (Altay & Labonte, 
2014, p. S63). This is in line with de Ville de Goyet’s assertion that speed takes 
priority over information during emergency operations. Because of this, many 
organisations lack information on who is in their camps, what kind of injuries 
they have sustained, how many pregnant and breastfeeding women there are, 
or how much medical care was given, resulting in ad hoc allocation of 
resources. 
It is a possibility that aid organisations use simple measures of output, 
such as the number of people served, rather than more complex performance 
measures because of how they are funded (Kirsch, et al., 2012a, p. 85; Kirsch, et 
al., 2012b, pp. 280-281). The development sector is unique in that it is not 
funded by its beneficiaries. In the food and beverage sector, customers who are 
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unsatisfied with the quality of the products they consume can choose to take 
their business elsewhere. Businesses that consistently perform poorly lose 
market share and eventually go bankrupt (Kirsch, et al., 2012b, p. 281). Aid 
recipients who are unsatisfied with aid are not typically provided with an 
opportunity for feedback (Kirsch, et al., 2013, p. 565). Instead, NGOs create 
reports on simple outputs. More complex measures focused on quality may 
show less attractive results, and NGOs whose performance is seen as sub-par 
are not attractive to donors. 
Very little of the aid money distributed went to the Haitian government 
or to Haitian organisations and companies. Of the aid that Canada gave three-
fourths went to Canadian companies in Canada, and was spent on Canadian 
survivors (Bellegarde-Smith, 2011, p. 266). Of all the aid given by all donors, 
only about one percent was given to the government of Haiti; donors were 
reluctant to give to the Haitian government due to concerns of corruption, 
inefficiency, and lack of capacity. International NGOs and contractors received 
57% of the aid given. The remainder went to the donor country’s own 
militaries. While the private contracting process was a gold rush for 
international NGOs, Haitian-led NGOs tended to be excluded, receiving only 
$9.45 million in USAID contracts while three-fourths of USAID funding went to 
private contractors headquartered in the Washington, DC area. Many of those 
DC-area contractors, such as Chemonics, Development Alternatives Inc (DAI), 
CH2M Hill Constructors, Flour Enterprises, The Shaw Group, MHW Americas, 
and Agility Logistics have been involved in controversies in Iraq, Afghanistan, 
or Hurricane Katrina relief.3 However, USAID does not have data on how the 
money given to contractors was spent (Ramachandran & Walz, 2012, pp. 9-13, 
                                                 
3
 See corruption, inefficiency, and lack of capacity. 
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24-27). The fact that donors held a deep mistrust of the Haitian government 
reflects the same mistrust of the Haitian government held by the American and 
Canadian media, where journalists wrote of corruption, inefficiency, and lack of 
capacity. 
It is unsurprising that the vast majority of USAID funding for earthquake 
relief in Haiti went to American companies. While USAID is the international 
development arm of the United States government, its mandate, the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961, was enacted in the context of American security and 
economic interests (Weisenfeld, 2011, p. 1103). It therefore should come as no 
surprise that the United States military and American contractors took the 
opportunity to rush into Haiti immediately following the earthquake. The 
American military’s presence in Haiti provided not only security for American 
citizens in Haiti (many of whom were housed on US embassy grounds before 
being flown out of the US-military-run airport in Port-au-Prince immediately 
after the earthquake), but also provided an extra military base for the United 
States. As in Canada, American economic interests were also served with the 
use of American contractors. The Canadian International Development Agency 
(CIDA) has a similar mandate to that of USAID. Just as the American and 
Canadian media focused a great deal on their own citizens affected by the 
earthquake rather than on Haitians, American and Canadian government aid 
focused a great deal on their own economic interests, rather than the economic 
wellbeing of Haitians affected by the earthquake. 
It is conceivable that Haiti would look quite different today if aid had 
been distributed differently. If aid focused on all affected areas, rather than 
focusing primarily on the easy-to-access areas in Port-au-Prince, there would 
not be hundreds of thousands of Haitians still living in nearly 500 “temporary 
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camps” (Altay & Labonte, 2014, p. S64). Had organisations such as the Red 
Cross and MSF prioritised data collection and documentation, and focused on 
complex performance measures, such as impact, quality, and satisfaction, they 
may have been able to more efficiently and effectively distribute aid to the 
Haitian people (Kirsch, et al., 2012a, p. 85). In addition, those data would have 
been invaluable in deciding how to approach future disasters, such as the 2015 
earthquakes in Nepal. And had USAID, CIDA, and other aid agencies given aid 
directly to the Haitian government or used more Haitian contractors, it is 
possible that the Haitian economy could provide those jobs that the Haitian 
people needed. 
Who decides? 
According to a recovery sector analysis by the United Nations Office of 
the Special Envoy for Haiti, the Government of Haiti had in place an 18-month 
budget that detailed those areas in which they wanted to focus the recovery. As 
the Haitian government could not fund the recovery itself, it had to rely on 
donations by individuals, NGOs, and governments. At the International 
Donor’s Conference in New York in March of 2010, $5.5 billion was pledged by 
countries and intergovernmental organisations. However, donor pledges and 
disbursement did not match the recommendations of the budget. In certain 
sectors, such as reconstruction, financial and economic recovery, and 
institutional rebuilding, pledges and disbursements were only a fraction of 
what the Haitian government had requested. 
For reconstruction, the Haitian government had requested $780 million 
(UN Office of the Special Envoy for Haiti, 2012). Finland, France, Germany, the 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), Luxembourg, Qatar, Spain, and 
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Switzerland pledged $128.8 million; between 2010 and 2012, $100.1 million of 
that was disbursed (UN Office of the Special Envoy for Haiti, 2012). For 
financial and economic recovery, the Haitian government requested $200.0 
million; of that, $64.9 million was pledged, but only $12.8 million was disbursed 
(UN Office of the Special Envoy for Haiti, 2012). In other sectors, such as 
transport, and water and sanitation, the pledges and disbursements had far 
exceeded the requests of the Haitian government. For the transport sector, the 
Government of Haiti only requested $180 million; however, Brazil, Canada, 
France, the European Commission (EC), the IDB, Japan, the United States, 
Venezuela, and the World Bank pledged $998.1 million, and had disbursed 
$512.8 million between 2010 and 2012 (UN Office of the Special Envoy for Haiti, 
2012). For water and sanitation, the Haitian government requested $160 million; 
$261.4 million was pledged and $224.4 million was disbursed (UN Office of the 
Special Envoy for Haiti, 2012).  
Likewise, where Haiti requested $372 million for strengthening the 
administration, $155 million for democratic institutions, and $20 million for 
support to parliament, only $46.3 million, $23.9 million, and $2.2 million 
respectively were disbursed (UN Office of the Special Envoy for Haiti, 2012). 
The lack of support for institutional rebuilding highlights the international 
community’s distrust in the governance capabilities of the Haitian government. 
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Figure 1. Recovery grant activities by sector as of December 2012 in USD millions. Government of Haiti 18-
month budget vs. pledges made at flash appeal at New York donors' conference vs. total disbursed 2010-2012. 
Source: UN Office of the Special Envoy to Haiti 
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The donors, which included the governments of several countries such 
as the US, Canada, Spain, Brazil, and France, and intergovernmental 
organisations such as the EC, IDB, the World Bank, and the Organisation of 
American states, were clearly directing the distribution of recovery aid. Had 
these governments and IGOs given their aid directly to the government of 
Haiti, the aid distribution would have looked very different. The donor 
countries and organisations directed the flow of recovery aid because they 
provided the funding, and the funding they provided was directed at specific 
areas. The actor best suited to lead disaster recovery is the state (Amin, et al., 
2008, pp. 17-18; de Ville de Goyet, 2008a, pp. 24-25); the removal of this capacity 
is disempowering to the state. In addition, the inability of the Haitian 
government to direct the earthquake recovery effort left aid organisation with 
no central government coordinator, and placed it under the control of multiple 
actors working independently of each other. The lack of a central coordinator 
meant that no master planning could occur. 
What data were available? 
The 2010 earthquake in Haiti killed either 222,570 people (Fatton Jr., 
2011, p. 164; Pierre-Louis, 2011, p. 187; Orelien, et al., 2013, p. 29), 230,000 people 
(Bellegarde-Smith, 2011, p. 265), 250,000 people (Lundy, 2011b, p. 204; Gros, 
2011, p. 132), 316,000 people (Weisenfeld, 2011, p. 1099), or somewhere between 
230,000 and 316,000 people (Benjamin, et al., 2011, p. 307), according to 
different academic sources . Some of these different estimates are from the 
same issue of one journal, highlighting the significant lack of confidence in 
available data. Official government reports say 222,570 people were killed in the 
earthquake (UN Office of the Secretary-General, 2010, p. 1). Over one year post-
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earthquake, mortality estimates still varied by over 40 percent. This highlights 
the fact that there were serious impediments to collecting sufficient 
information for decision-making and coordination in the earthquake’s 
aftermath.  
Impediments to decision-making included a lack of prioritisation of data 
collection, which was linked to the urgency of the initial relief response in the 
earthquake’s aftermath. The inaccessibility of areas both within and outside of 
Port-au-Prince meant that data were not collected in those areas, making the 
provision of adequate aid problematic. Data were often unreliable, especially 
with regards to the time-sensitive operations necessary within the first few 
hours and days of the disaster relief operation; often, aid agencies did not 
prioritise the collection of data, claiming that their time and resources were 
more efficiently used in saving lives. By the time needs assessments were 
conducted, compiled, and released, they were outdated. For example, the Rapid 
Initial Needs Assessment for Haiti (RINAH), conducted between 25 January and 
6 February, was released so late that the information was no longer usable 
(Grünewald & Renaudin, 2010, p. 30; Rencoret, et al., 2010, p. 25). 
Crowdsourcing and social networks were a cheap, quick method of gathering 
data post-disaster in the aftermath (Barbier, et al., 2012, pp. 258-259; Gao, et al., 
2011, p. 10; Yang, et al., 2014, p. 2025), however, they lacked a ‘common 
information system’ that could coordinate information for all response groups 
(Barbier, et al., 2012, p. 259). Furthermore, crowdsourced data were also 
unreliable, as it was difficult to verify the source of the data (Barbier, et al., 
2012, p. 262; Altay & Labonte, 2014, p. S62; Gao, et al., 2011, pp. 11-12). 
Where data did exist, the relief effort was hampered by a failure to make 
it accessible. Many decision-making meetings were held at the UN Stabilization 
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Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) base, which was difficult to access from certain 
parts of Port-au-Prince and was kept under tight security, leaving many NGOs 
unable to participate in information sharing. Furthermore, meetings were held 
in English rather than French (or Haitian Creole), the official language of Haiti, 
which effectively excluded those Haitian NGOs whose employees did not speak 
English (Altay & Labonte, 2014, p. S60). Some organisations that had collected 
data (especially large, well-funded organisations) were unwilling to share that 
data with other organisations (Altay & Labonte, 2014, p. S63). As these 
organisations had seemingly unlimited funds, they did not see the need to 
share their data with other organisations because they did not need anything in 
return. This led to overlaps and redundancies, as multiple organisations would 
survey the same areas and collect the same information, while other areas 
remained un-surveyed and unserved.  
When data were shared, it was often inconsistent. Data collection and 
analysis often did not use uniform definitions across agencies (or sometimes 
even within agencies themselves) (Altay & Labonte, 2014, p. S62). Concepts 
such as ‘affected populations’ were ambiguous, lowering the reliability of 
information (Rencoret, et al., 2010, p. 26). Agreement on definitions, codes, and 
categories is essential for good information management (Amin, et al., 2008, 
pp. 13-14). Furthermore, NGOs that did share data often used different 
information-sharing systems. While UN OCHA uses the OneResponse website 
for aid coordination, many NGOs often used Google Groups and Google Docs, 
storing their information on simple spreadsheets (Altay & Labonte, 2014, pp. 
S62-S63), rather than a purpose-built database. 
These impediments to disaster relief decision-making and coordination 
meant that there was not a great deal of information available in the immediate 
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aftermath of the earthquake. The lack of data affected disaster relief efforts at 
every stage. The World Health Organisation and the US Federal Emergency 
Management Agency both identify four stages of a disaster. They are: 
mitigation (prevention), preparedness (planning), response, and recovery 
(Benjamin, et al., 2011, pp. 306, 308). Mitigation and preparedness are essential, 
clearly evidenced by the difference in the impacts of the 7.0-magnitude 
earthquake in Port-au-Prince in 2010, a similar earthquake in San Francisco in 
1993, which killed fewer than 100 people, and the 8.5-magnitude earthquake in 
Concepción, Chile, in 2010, which killed fewer than 1000 (Pierre-Louis, 2011, p. 
187). The response phase is the most crucial phase after a disaster occurs. The 
first 24 to 48 hours after a disaster is when lifesaving attempts are both most 
effective and most difficult, as infrastructure is often destroyed and roads are 
blocked by debris. It is because of this that most survivors are saved by their 
neighbours (Benjamin, et al., 2011, p. 309). The recovery phase describes the 
attempt to return to normalcy, but is also an opportunity to rebuild in a way 
that may prevent or mitigate future disaster. 
While mitigation and preparedness fall outside of the scope of this 
dissertation, it is important to note that they perform an important role in the 
response stage. Preparedness involves collection of baseline data, such as 
accurate maps of communities (especially those in remote areas), demographic 
data, and housing information (Amin, et al., 2008, pp. 13-14, 18-19). Lacking this 
information, first responders in Port-au-Prince did not know who they were 
looking for and what their needs might be. For example, relief workers who 
were unaware of systems of food and water flow in Haiti prior to the 
earthquake made assumptions that led to an influx of food and water from 
various humanitarian aid organisations. There was no data, however, to suggest 
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that there was a food shortage, especially as the earthquake caused only limited 
damage to farmland, and the United Nations World Food Programme already 
had hundreds of thousands of meals in storage in warehouses in Port-au-Prince 
(Katz, 2015). Furthermore, there was no data to suggest that there was a 
drinking water shortage; Port-au-Prince lacked the piping infrastructure that 
would have been vulnerable to earthquake damage (Katz, 2015). Housing, 
however, had taken a disastrous hit, and millions of people were left in poorly-
constructed temporary camps. The cost of food and water aid and the 
associated flow of personnel could have been better diverted toward dealing 
with this more pressing issue. Instead, relief efforts were characterised by a 
problem of logistics and a lack of data regarding what was actually needed.  
Conclusion 
The allocation of resources and personnel in the relief and recovery 
efforts after the 2010 earthquake in Haiti matches, in part, the discourses seen 
in the American and Canadian media, especially in the areas of violence, 
governance, needs, and Americans’ and Canadians’ interests in Haiti. While 
there was very little looting or violence, the United States sent tens of 
thousands of troops to Haiti in order to ‘secure’ the country. When Haiti 
appealed to the international community for funds for institutional rebuilding, 
such as strengthening the administration and support to parliament, they were 
largely ignored due to fears of corruption and bad governance, matching the 
discourses of Haitian governance as portrayed in the media. Distribution of aid 
was clumsy, and many of those affected by the earthquake reported 
dissatisfaction with the aid received. Finally, just as many of the stories in 
American and Canadian media focused on American and Canadian experiences 
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in Haiti, with Haitians as a backdrop, much of the their aid to Haiti was focused 
on American and Canadian survivors. Furthermore, the vast majority of this aid 
also went to American and Canadian contractors.4  
                                                 
4
 This is not all to say that the international humanitarian effort in Haiti was directed by the 
American and Canadian media. I simply note a correlation. It is entirely possible that the 
American and Canadian media, USAID, CIDA, and the thousands of American and Canadian 
NGOs operating in Haiti are influenced by the another factor, or that the media is influenced 
by the aid typically sent by their countries. This was not a quantitative study, although a 
quantitative study would make an interesting future project. 
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Chapter 3. The efficacy of the 
humanitarian response to the 
earthquake 
You can have data without information, but you cannot have 
information without data. 
- Daniel Keys Moran, American science fiction author 
This chapter will discuss the efficacy of the humanitarian response to 
the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, examine three paradigms suggesting why this was 
not as effective as it could have been, consider whose data were used, and look 
at beneficiary feedback as an alternative means of evaluation of the 
humanitarian response. In order to evaluate the efficacy of the humanitarian 
response to the earthquake, it is essential to take into consideration whether 
the goal of recovery is to restore pre-disaster levels of service (that is, to return 
Haiti to what it was on 11 January 2010) or to seize the opportunity to develop 
(de Ville de Goyet, 2008a, p. 33). As Haiti was the least developed country in the 
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Western Hemisphere as well as a republic of NGOs—purportedly working 
toward development—prior to the earthquake, the goal of recovery should have 
been to redevelop Haiti to a greater state than it had been in before; this would 
ensure a better standard of living for the Haitian people and mitigate the 
potential damage of a future earthquake or other natural disaster. By either 
standard, the humanitarian response was deeply flawed. Haiti has failed to 
return even to pre-earthquake conditions in the five years since the disaster.5 
Humanitarian aid workers in Haiti were somewhat successful in the 
immediate response to the earthquake in that they were able to relocate 
hundreds of thousands of earthquake-affected Haitians to camps away from the 
danger caused by structural damage. Although they provided food, water, 
medical attention, and supplies to families, it could have been done with 
greater efficiency. The relief effort in Haiti was plagued by logistical problems 
and a lack of organisation, as has been outlined above. 
Haiti, however, failed to graduate from the relief stage to the recovery 
stage. Six months post-earthquake, over a million Haitians still resided in 
camps, despite the more than one billion dollars in aid that had been given by 
that time (Pierre-Louis, 2011, p. 199). One year later, almost half of all Haitians 
who had moved into camps after the earthquake still resided in camps, rather 
than returning to their neighbourhoods (Kirsch, et al., 2012a, p. 91). Even a full 
three years post-earthquake, hundreds of thousands of Haitians still lived in 
nearly 500 camps across Port-au-Prince (Altay & Labonte, 2014, p. S64). It is of 
little surprise that the recovery process in Haiti has been significantly slower 
than the immediate response. For the “business of aid” (Birdsall, 2008, p. 516) to 
                                                 
5
 Disaster recovery is not a quick process. After Hurricane Katrina struck New Orleans in 2005, 
the city took nearly a decade to return to normalcy. Port-au-Prince and the surrounding areas 
had significantly less preparation and governmental resources available than did New Orleans. 
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be sustainable, humanitarian aid must be required for the long term. When 
disaster victims no longer need the assistance of humanitarian aid workers, 
those workers no longer have a job; thus, rather than moving into recovery as 
soon as possible, humanitarian aid agencies remain in the relief phase until 
relief funds have run out (de Ville de Goyet, 2008a, p. 32).  
Three paradigms 
Most existing academic literature relevant to Haitian disaster recovery 
fall into three camps: The academics in a special edition of the Journal of Black 
Studies (JBS) from one year after the earthquake in Haiti cited an over-
intrusion by NGOs and foreign agendas as the reason that Haiti failed to 
recover from the earthquake (Lundy, 2011a; Gros, 2011; Fatton Jr., 2011; Pierre-
Louis, 2011; Bellegarde-Smith, 2011; Germain, 2011). The contributors to a 2008 
World Bank compilation, Data Against Disasters: Establishing Effective 
Systems for Relief, Reconstruction, and Recovery believed that NGOs’ lack of 
use of (or underutilisation of) data is the critical shortcoming in humanitarian 
aid efforts (Amin, et al., 2008; de Ville de Goyet, 2008a; McDonald & Gordon, 
2008). A group of researchers from Johns Hopkins University Bloomberg School 
of Public Health, who published a series of articles on humanitarian aid 
evaluation, argue that humanitarian aid efforts fail because they are being 
assessed incorrectly, therefore appearing as successes in yearly reports, and that 
more nuanced assessments including the feedback of aid beneficiaries and 
complex measures would lead to more successful humanitarian aid; another 
argument that emphasises the importance of data (Kirsch, et al., 2012a; Kirsch, 
et al., 2012b; Kirsch, et al., 2013; Weiss, et al., 2014). 
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The Journal of Black Studies contributors suggest that the intrusion of 
foreign NGOs, governments, and international financial institutions led Haiti 
into dependency, holding it in a cycle of poverty, and that continuation of these 
policies post-earthquake pushes Haiti further into dependency. JBS contributor 
Jean-Germain Gros (2011) believes that much damage could have been 
prevented if Haiti had been able to enforce existing building codes and provide 
emergency care, but internationally-imposed anti-state policies dating from the 
1980s, which channelled development aid through NGOs instead of state-
building, allowed Haiti to become a failed state (pp. 133-134). The very same 
NGOs and governments that created Haiti’s problems were now taking charge 
of its redevelopment. He suggests that the only adequate solution is a 
reorganisation of the government, focusing on decentralisation but not 
devolution, and a military capable of deploying quick aid; only the Haitian 
government can sufficiently rebuild Haiti (pp. 148-154).  
Like Gros, Robert Fatton Jr (2011) writes that the earthquake’s effects on 
Haiti were the result of over-intervention from foreign NGOs and international 
financial institutions (IFIs). For the past three decades, more than ten thousand 
NGOs, undemocratic and unaccountable to the Haitian public, have been 
carrying out the development work normally done by a state; IFIs contributed 
to the problem by prompting a transition from agriculture to garment 
manufacture, causing Haiti to urbanise and became dependent on imports for 
food (pp. 171-175). Haitians see the failed recovery effort as a missed opportunity 
to develop Haiti and a continuation of the status quo (p. 171). François Pierre-
Louis (2011) notes that NGOs had taken on the social, political, and economic 
roles normally handled by the state, including democracy enhancement, 
conflict resolution, and economic projects (pp. 190-193). However, certain roles 
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could not or were not filled by NGOs. At the time of the earthquake, Haiti 
lacked any emergency management system; foreign neoliberal influence to 
minimise government could have been the cause of this (p. 198). NGOs were 
unable to address needs such as establishing order, distributing food, and 
ensuring citizens’ safety after the earthquake, and there was insufficient 
coordination between NGOs to distribute aid (pp. 199-200). 
Like the JBS contributors, the authors of the World Bank compilation 
believe that national authorities are the appropriate principal actors in disaster 
relief, and thus capacity building is essential (Amin, et al., 2008, pp. 17-18; de 
Ville de Goyet, 2008a, pp. 24-25). However, they argue that failures in disaster 
relief and recovery primarily stem from failures to utilise data before, during, 
and after a natural disaster (McDonald & Gordon, 2008; Amin, et al., 2008, p. 2; 
de Ville de Goyet, 2008a). They emphasise that it is essential to have a disaster 
information management system in place with baseline data available in 
advance of any potential disaster (Amin, et al., 2008, pp. 18-19). Claude de Ville 
de Goyet argues that although information gathering is fundamental to 
addressing the needs of those affected and displaced by a disaster, time 
pressure constrains the ability of aid workers to collect data in the aftermath. 
He also notes that while acting quickly is necessary, organisations do not take 
time to gather information even after the most critical time period has passed 
(de Ville de Goyet, 2008a, pp. 52-53). Many inappropriate disaster responses 
may have been avoided had data been collected and analysed. 
The team from Johns Hopkins University identify the use of the correct 
indicators as a key factor in disaster relief and recovery. They argue that while a 
great deal of money was spent on humanitarian aid in the wake of the 
earthquake, the impact of relief and recovery efforts were poorly documented, 
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and generally focused on measurement of outputs, such as number of meals 
served, number of amputations performed, and quantity of tarpaulins 
distributed, rather than more complex measures that indicate the overall 
wellbeing of populations under the care of NGOs, such as the time spent daily 
to collect water from a protected source after the earthquake compared to 
before the earthquake (Kirsch, et al., 2012a, p. 85). They emphasise that this is 
because disaster relief is an unregulated industry and humanitarian agencies 
are accountable to donors rather than beneficiaries; they stress that 
“accountability to donors should not be mistaken for quality assurance” 
(Kirsch, et al., 2012b, p. 281). Instead, they suggest that beneficiary satisfaction 
surveys be taken into account when evaluating the effectiveness of 
humanitarian aid (Doocy, et al., 2013; Kirsch, et al., 2012a; Kirsch, et al., 2012b; 
Kirsch, et al., 2013; Weiss, et al., 2014). Qualitative and quantitative assessments 
of beneficiaries would ensure greater accountability to beneficiaries as well as 
to donors. 
The use of data 
As it was one of the first major disasters in the new age of big data, there 
were several attempts to collect and utilise data in the humanitarian efforts 
following the earthquake. The Rapid Needs Initial Assessment for Haiti 
(RINAH) report, mentioned in the previous chapter, attempted to gather rough 
estimates of earthquake damage and displacement, but it was released in an 
untimely fashion. Crowdsourced Crisis Camp “Hackathons for Haiti” were 
another attempt to collect and utilise data for humanitarian aid in Haiti, but 
were plagued with issues of incompatibility, meaning that humanitarian aid 
workers were unable to manipulate and make use of the data in the manner 
they saw fit. Finally, there were hundreds of evaluations made by international 
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humanitarian organisations;6 however, many evaluations used overly simple 
indicators, as discussed in the previous chapter. 
The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) conducted RINAH from 
23 January to 06 February 2010. However RINAH was not as rapid as its name 
would convey; it began almost two weeks after the earthquake and was 
published almost a month after the earthquake. The data that it provided was 
outdated and unreliable by the time it was disseminated, as it concerned the 
short-term needs of those affected by the earthquake (Altay & Labonte, 2014, p. 
S65). An initial needs assessment is essential following any disaster. However, 
as time is of the essence, it should be deployed immediately, conducted and 
compiled quickly, and disseminated without hesitation. 
There was significant media attention regarding “Hackathons for Haiti” 
wherein tech-savvy individuals gathered with the intention of using data-
centric solutions to help with humanitarian efforts, despite not actually 
knowing what they were attempting to create in advance of the hackathon 
(Brewer, 2010; Pool, 2010). In collaboration with Ushahidi, a non-profit software 
company with the slogan “crowdsourcing crisis information”, ‘hackers’ used 
OpenStreetMap (OSM) to overlay crowdsourced data onto a map. 
Unfortunately, OSM and Ushahidi’s software were not fully interoperable, 
meaning that data were not searchable, lists could not be generated, and the 
hackathon’s efforts were of little use to those aid workers who would have 
benefitted from these data (Heinzelman, et al., 2011, p. 2). Despite these early 
issues, the hackathon was an innovative idea that has great potential for future 
use in humanitarian aid. Crowdsourcing has the potential to involve many 
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 Many of these may be found at Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance 
in Humanitarian Action’s website, via http://www.alnap.org/current/haitiportalresources 
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more remote international humanitarian workers assisting in disaster relief and 
recovery without many of the problems associated with spontaneous 
volunteers, such as the need to feed, house, and train them. It also has the 
potential to include local residents, allowing them to express needs, offer local 
knowledge, and provide feedback about existing aid. In the future, greater 
consideration must be given to the goal of the hackathon, the platform that will 
be used by humanitarian workers (Altay & Labonte, 2014, p. S62), and the 
reliability of crowdsourced data (Barbier, et al., 2012, p. 262; Altay & Labonte, 
2014, p. S62; Gao, et al., 2011, pp. 11-12). 
The collection, utilisation, and sharing of data could have helped aid 
organisations to more efficiently and effectively provide aid. Maintaining data 
on survivor locations and checked buildings/neighbourhoods could have 
avoided the redundancy of double- and triple-checking locations during the 
time-critical search and rescue operations in the crucial first 72 hours after the 
earthquake. This would have allowed teams to work faster to ensure that every 
building in Port-au-Prince and the surrounding areas was accounted for. 
Sharing these data with other aid organisations could have prevented doubling 
up of efforts (de Ville de Goyet, 2008a, p. 35). Tracking supplies entering Haiti 
at customs, in conjunction with maintaining a central list of supply needs, 
would have been a practical means of matching supplies, especially unsolicited 
ones, with the people in need of them. As the international humanitarian 
response to the earthquake was characterised by western media as a logistical 
nightmare, a system of tracking supplies and needs could have avoided 
situations such the incident described in The Globe and Mail where dozens of 
pallets loaded with bottled water remained idly on the tarmac of the Port-au-
Prince airport as hundreds of thousands of people went thirsty (Waldie, 2010). 
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When considering the use of data in disaster relief and recovery, it is 
important to consider whose data were used, whose data were not used, and 
the reasons for this. Most of the data that were used by individual humanitarian 
actors in Haiti were produced by foreign entities rather than Haitian 
organisations or Haitian government ministries. Furthermore, most of the data 
used by humanitarian actors were produced by the organisations themselves, as 
a result of a low level of data sharing. These organisations assumed, from the 
beginning, that no data were readily available. Had there been greater data 
sharing and coordination among organisations, some redundant data collection 
may have been avoided, and many organisations that had not utilised data 
because of the difficulty or cost of data collection may have been able to utilise 
data in their operations.  
Data from local Haitian NGOs (or from the Haitian government itself) 
were not widely used. As many decision-making meetings were held in English 
at the difficult-to-access MINUSTAH base, many Haitian NGOs were not able 
to participate, either because their personnel could not access the site or 
because they only spoke French or Haitian Creole7 (Altay & Labonte, 2014, p. 
S60). This kept Haitian earthquake efforts separate from the international 
community’s efforts, limiting the potential of local institutional knowledge to 
contribute to planning and organisation. Many aid workers do not find it 
necessary to know the society and culture in which they work; for many, it is 
simply enough to “know development” (Ferguson, 1990, p. 260) or, in this case, 
to “know disaster relief,” and do what they know how to do, rather than 
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 It is worth noting, however, that the despite the English-language title, the Rapid Initial Needs 
Assessment for Haiti (RINAH) report was released in French (ACAPS, 2010). 
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utilising the best strategy for the local culture and climate (Altay & Labonte, 
2014, p. S64). However by not prioritising local institutional data and 
information, and using only imported knowledge, humanitarian aid workers 
may have had a damaging impact.  
It is possible that local institutional knowledge was ignored for many of 
the same reasons that data, in general, was underutilised: it was considered too 
difficult and too time-consuming. Utilizing local institutional knowledge 
requires foreign aid workers to liaise with local aid workers. Most foreign aid 
workers spoke English, as the majority of them came from the United States 
and Canada and used English as a lingua franca. Liaison would require finding 
local personnel, hiring translators, and holding information-sharing meetings, a 
time-consuming process. Alternatively, aid workers could rely on assumptions 
based on prior knowledge from other projects. While this may prove to be 
advantageous for the short-term, it can have a long-term detrimental impact, 
may take longer (and therefore add greater financial cost) and beneficiaries 
may not be satisfied with the aid received. 
Beneficiary Feedback 
It is important to include the feedback of beneficiaries at all stages of the 
humanitarian aid process. Much like the utilisation of local institutional 
knowledge, it can both empower the local population and provide useful data. 
Of course, feedback alone is by no means transformative or a sign of 
empowerment;8 it is, however, representative, giving a voice to those 
communities that receive aid (Michener, 1998, pp. 2106-2107), and is also a 
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 A community following the will of an NGO certainly is not empowered (Michener, 1998). Nor 
is one that is told what they need in order to be empowered; that is disempowering (Rahnema, 
1992). 
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means of keeping humanitarian aid agencies accountable to the communities 
in which they work.  
A team of researchers from the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of 
Public Health have conducted a series of medium-term surveys of beneficiaries 
of humanitarian aid following the 2010 earthquake in Haiti (Kirsch, et al., 
2012a), the 2010 floods in Pakistan (Kirsch, et al., 2013), and other disasters 
(Kirsch, et al., 2012b). They found that beneficiaries were generally unsatisfied 
with the quality of aid that they had received; this is consistent with trends that 
de Ville de Goyet (2008a, pp. 22-23) noted. Significantly, this is in contradiction 
to reports made by NGOs. This contradiction can be attributed to differences in 
methodology. Nongovernmental organisations rely on the support of donors in 
order to continue to stay in business. Therefore, when electing which 
information to include in yearly donor reports, NGOs opt to use indicators that 
represent themselves in a good light.  
The Johns Hopkins team (Kirsch, et al., 2012a) found that Haitians who 
were still living in camps in January 2011, one year after the earthquake, were 
much slower to recover than those who had returned to living in 
neighbourhoods. Those still living in camps experienced a 56% reduction in 
income, compared to a 35% reduction in income among those living in 
neighbourhoods (p. 87). They also found that those still in camps were of a 
lower pre-earthquake socioeconomic status than those who had moved back to 
neighbourhoods (p. 87). These in-camp households, while more likely to have 
received assistance, were still less economically secure than households that 
returned to neighbourhoods (p. 92). Reports from NGOs are likely to have 
mentioned that the NGOs continue to house and feed hundreds of thousands 
of Haitians, but are unlikely to report that residents of their camps have fared 
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worse than those outside of the camps. More unsettling is that worldwide, the 
number of people in internally displaced persons camps has been increasing, as 
has the duration of their stay in these camps. 
It is important to note that efficacy evaluations should not be based 
solely on beneficiary surveys. Because many Haitians view foreign aid as one 
collective agency, those interviewed may be referring to a combination of 
projects rather than the specific project under evaluation (Ramachandran & 
Walz, 2012, pp. 31-32). Furthermore, in top-down approaches to development it 
is possible that beneficiaries respond in a manner that they believe aid workers 
would want to hear, either portraying the aid as overly successful in an effort to 
make aid workers look good and to keep them around, or as not successful 
enough, to make it seem as though the aid work is not yet finished, in order to 
continue receiving it (Michener, 1998, pp. 2112-2114; Johnson, 1999, p. 171).  
The International Committee of the Red Cross did survey Haitians to 
learn what their priorities were following the earthquake. Haitians were 
reported as wanting jobs, income, and access to credit, as labour demand had 
decreased (Kirsch, et al., 2012a, pp. 85-86). Manuel Orozco and Elisabeth 
Burgess (2011, pp. 237-243), whose study focuses on remittances of Haitians 
living abroad, suggest that access to financial services is a key development 
tool.9 However, the humanitarian effort did not focus sufficiently on financial 
and economic recovery. In fact, during the March 2010 flash appeal at the 
International Donor’s Conference, Haiti had requested $200 million in the 
category of “financial and economic recovery, jobs”; it only received $12.8 
                                                 
9
 Where the international humanitarian community failed to provide financial services, the 
Haitian diaspora was able to step in. Orozco and Burgess found a ten percent increase in 
remittances to Haiti in the wake of the 2010 earthquake (2011, p. 226). Lundy also noted this 
increase in remittances (2011b, pp. 210-212). Orozco and Burgess see the Haitian diaspora as 
playing an important role in the development of Haiti (2011, pp. 243-245). 
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million for this sector. Had beneficiary feedback been taken into consideration 
by donor countries, the amount of money given in this sector would have 
exceeded $200 million. It is also likely that Haitians, with renewed access to 
jobs, income, and credit, would have been able to return to normalcy much 
more rapidly. 
Conclusion 
The recovery following the earthquake was largely a failure. While aid 
workers did manage to save thousands of lives and provide food and shelter to 
hundreds of thousands of Haitians, they failed to revitalise the economy of 
Haiti. This can be attributed, at least in part, to three reasons: the overreliance 
on NGOs, rather than the Haitian state, to coordinate the recovery process; the 
failure to gather, utilise, and share appropriate data; and the failure to include 
local institutional knowledge and the input of Haitian people. Improvements to 
the timeliness, format, and platform of existing data collection would have 
been likely to improve rates of utilisation and sharing of data in the 
humanitarian aid response. Finally, the scale of mismatched aid in Haiti 
indicates the importance of including beneficiary feedback at all stages in the 
humanitarian aid process in order to ensure that disaster recovery is actually 
being delivered. 
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Conclusion 
The future of Haiti must be linked to the respect of the rights of 
every single citizen. 
- Jean-Bertrand Aristide, former president of Haiti 
The 12 January 2010 earthquake known to Haitians as Goudougoudgou 
had a devastating impact on Haiti, sending more than a million Haitians to 
temporary settlement camps. Following the earthquake, generous individuals, 
organisations, and governments donated over $6 billion of aid to the Haitian 
people. However, the allocation of resources and personnel was not based on 
data of evidenced need. Aid workers claimed that they were too busy saving 
lives to worry about collecting data. It is probable that humanitarian aid 
workers made decisions based on Western media pressure—this study 
identified a strong correlation between media and donations—or based simply 
on what aid workers knew how to do. A lack of prioritisation, utilisation, and 
sharing of data and information led to the failure of the international 
humanitarian effort. This failure is evidenced by the hundreds of thousands of 
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Haitians that remained internally displaced persons for several years after the 
earthquake, rather than returning to normal life. 
Following the hypothesis that media rhetoric directs aid, a discourse 
analysis of the American and Canadian media’s coverage of the earthquake was 
conducted. Six emergent themes were found: the needs of the earthquake 
survivors, logistical problems in aid distribution, corruption and/or the Haitian 
government’s inability to govern, stories focusing on Americans or Canadians 
as heroes, reports of alleged looting and the potential for violence, and religion 
(praising Christianity and demonising Vodou). The immediate material needs 
of Haitians as portrayed by the media were only partially supported by the 
RINAH report, and the media’s portrayal of needs matched the type of aid that 
was distributed in Haiti in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake. The 
media’s coverage of logistical problems encountered in aid distribution also 
proved to be accurate. The international community’s fears of corruption, 
inefficiency, and poor governance mirrored the concerns expressed by the 
media. Donor countries and organisations were reluctant to support the 
government of Haiti; instead, they created their own plans for recovery and 
gave their money to NGOs, completely circumventing Haiti’s 18-month 
recovery plan. American and Canadian government aid focused on those 
countries’ own economic interests more than the economic wellbeing of 
earthquake-affected Haitians; American and Canadian “aid to Haiti” went 
mostly to American and Canadian contractors, rather than providing the jobs 
that Haitians desired. Unfounded speculation of looting and violence provided 
the rhetorical public justification to the United States military to send thirty-
thousand troops to Haiti following the earthquake. Absent from the media (and 
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largely absent from the humanitarian effort in general) was the use of data in 
the decision-making process and the input of Haitians themselves.  
Had decisions about the direction of aid been based primarily on data 
rather than on media pressure, assumptions, aid workers’ own knowledge, or 
political agendas, Haiti may have had greater success in recovery. However, the 
effective use of data requires good baseline data, standardisation of definitions 
of terms such as ‘displaced’, consistency in the format in which the data are 
held, and reliability of data. In order for this to occur, the collection and 
sharing of data must be made a priority. In addition, in order to ensure 
beneficiary satisfaction, the international humanitarian community must take 
into consideration the input of the affected populations, as these are very 
important data. 
Throughout history, the Haitian people’s right to self-determination has 
been repeatedly stripped away, from French colonial slavery to authoritarian 
regimes to occupation by the US to more authoritarian regimes to modern-day 
imperialism in the form of aid. Rather than being voted upon by the electorate, 
Haitian planning decisions are made by the foreign NGOs that implement 
large-scale projects, and thus by the donors that fund the NGOs. In the process, 
Haitians are seldom consulted. Therefore, it is of little surprise that Haitians 
expressed dissatisfaction with aid received post-earthquake. While Haitians 
wanted jobs, income, and access to credit, the international donor community 
paid little attention to economic recovery and instead emphasised the short-
term ‘needs’ suggested by the front pages of newspapers.  
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In the earthquake relief and recovery effort, the international and NGO 
community’s decisions about the recovery process constituted an infringement 
on Haitian sovereignty. In order to avoid this situation, countries should 
maintain a record of aid supplies and personnel that enter the country after a 
disaster, through their existing customs and immigrations services, by requiring 
that all aid be declared upon arrival; this system has already been successfully 
implemented in Guatemala since the 1980s. Countries should also require that 
all aid organisations be registered with the government, perhaps in an existing 
ministry that regulates businesses and non-profit organisations, with robust 
reporting requirements that ensure that aid agencies collect standardised, 
accurate data about their work.  
Haiti was also unprepared to respond to the earthquake. Mitigation and 
preparedness are essential in order to ensure minimal loss of life and property 
in the event of a disaster. Port-au-Prince had become a death trap due to rapid 
“urbanisation without industrialisation” (Gros, 2011, p. 142), was overly 
centralised, and lacked sufficient disaster preparation (Pierre-Louis, 2011, p. 
198). Thus built into recovery processes must be the establishment of 
mechanisms of mitigation (such as enforcing existing building codes more 
strictly) and preparedness (such as early warning systems and evacuation plans, 
for example). A trained, local military would be the ideal unit to quickly deploy 
aid (Gros, 2011, pp. 148-152). Geographic organisation, such as dividing the 
country into postcodes or other similarly-sized units and giving street names 
and house numbers to every building in the country would be one method of 
facilitating the collection of baseline data, such as the number of households 
expected to reside in each particular postcode. A collection of such baseline 
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data would be useful post-disaster in search-and-rescue efforts and supply 
distribution. 
Following a major disaster, developing countries, especially least-
developed countries (LDCs), may lack the capacity to respond themselves. 
Because there may have been little to no mitigation or preparedness, these 
disasters tend to be the worst disasters in terms of the number of lives lost and 
the amount of infrastructural damage (Amin, et al., 2008, p. 1). In the poorest 
countries, otherwise-typical day-to-day tasks may be prohibitively costly; there 
is no room in the budget for disaster preparedness when there are not even 
sufficient funds to educate and provide medical care for the population. 
Instead, these countries live disaster-to-disaster. In such cases, it is important 
for the international humanitarian community to intervene in order to protect 
life. However, it is essential to intervene without infringing on the sovereignty 
of countries. 
This author proposes an international organisation responsible for the 
collection of data, the storage of data, and the coordination and distribution of 
aid, at the invitation of the disaster-affected country. This would not be a new 
organisation, but a new function of existing United Nations agencies that 
already have legitimacy and recognition in the area of humanitarian aid. The 
Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) would be the obvious choice, as it is 
the principal humanitarian aid coordinating body between UN organisations 
(FAO, UNFPA, UNDP, UNOCHA, UN-HABITAT, WFP and the WHO, among 
others) and non-UN partners such as the ICRC and the IFRC (McDonald & 
Gordon, 2008, p. 59). Under this new mandate, the IASC (or an organisation 
that it delegates) would regularly collect good baseline data in LDCs, such as 
geography and demographics, at a precise level of disaggregation, before any 
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sort of disaster occurs. When a disaster does occur, there will be sufficient 
information, such as where communities exist and how many people can be 
expected to be found there.  
When a disaster occurs, the head of government (or the acting head of 
government) could request assistance in data collection (such as a rapid initial 
needs assessment) to be performed by United Nations Disaster Assessment and 
Coordination (UNDAC), data storage (in a central repository), and/or the 
coordination of the distribution of aid. If data collection assistance is requested, 
the IASC could work with its partners to survey the affected area, while 
ensuring the use of consistent methods, measurements, and definitions. The 
IASC, UNDAC, or the disaster-affected country would delegate villages or 
neighbourhoods to partner NGOs for data collection in order to ensure that no 
populated areas are overlooked and that resources are not wasted double- or 
triple-surveying areas. These surveys would gather information such as (but not 
limited to) building damage, survivor numbers and locations, and availability of 
food and water, in a standardised format. This information would be stored in 
the repository to be compared against baseline data. 
 If coordination in the distribution of aid is requested, aid organisations 
that wish to help in aid distribution would be required to register with the 
IASC, noting their supplies, personnel, and expected aid capacity. The supply-
registration requirement would ensure that it is known precisely what 
resources are available and where they are. It would also avoid mismatches in 
the donated supplies that arrive in a country after a disaster. Larger 
organisations would be allocated villages or neighbourhoods in which to work, 
and smaller organisations would be grouped and allocated areas in which to 
work. Each organisation would be required to collect and submit standardised 
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data on their work, supply levels, and beneficiaries. The data that they would be 
required to provide would not be simply measures of output, but more complex 
measures such as impact, quality, and satisfaction. 
Under this plan, policies must be implemented in order to respect the 
sovereignty of the disaster-affected nation (as specified in the IASC’s mandate 
by the third point in the “Guiding Principles” section of A/RES/46/182). First, 
this assistance must only come at the request of the disaster-affected state. 
Neither the IASC nor any states or organisation may enter uninvited, as the US 
military did in its takeover of the Port-au-Prince airport. Secondly, the disaster-
affected state may choose those areas in which it desires assistance, and may 
reject any proposals. Third, while the IASC may advise on the allocation of 
resources, the government decides where it deems assistance necessary. This 
would avoid the scenario in which Haiti found itself at the flash appeal, 
wherein it had presented an 18-month budget detailing specific areas of focus 
for recovery, but donor countries and organisations directed their money 
toward other areas.  
Giving the IASC the role of emergency surveyor and coordinator would 
relieve the government of the disaster-affected country of the burden of 
managing disaster relief on its own. Keeping the country’s government in 
charge of decision-making regarding the allocation of aid resources and 
personnel would ensure that the country’s sovereignty is not infringed upon. 
Delegating disaster relief and recovery aid work to NGOs would ensure that 
NGOs could continue to use their expertise, albeit more efficiently, with the 
help of data. The partnership between the disaster-affected country, the IASC, 
NGOs, and the international community, with the use of open, easily-accessible 
data, would build transparency in the disaster relief and recovery process. 
The use of data in international humanitarian responses 
to the 2010 earthquake in Haiti 
73 
 
There are certain problems for which this proposal does not yet provide 
a solution. This proposal does not solve the problem of NGOs and contractors 
bringing in foreign products rather than purchasing local ones (although the 
disaster-affected country could restrict or limit the import of food aid if it 
determines that the local supply of food is enough, for instance). This proposal 
also does not solve the problem of jobs, income, and access to credit for 
disaster survivors, although the country could decide that a certain amount of 
the resources be directed toward this. It would also be necessary to develop 
means of data collection and reporting that would be compatible with the need 
for urgency in the initial aftermath of a disaster. 
Future Research 
An interesting follow-up study would be an examination of the use of 
data in the international relief and recovery efforts following the 2015 
earthquake in Nepal. In the five years since the earthquake in Haiti, “big data” 
and “open data” have become hot topics in business and government, and new 
technologies have emerged allowing better analysis of data. It would be 
interesting to see whether the actors working in the international humanitarian 
response to the 2015 earthquake in Nepal utilised and shared data to a greater 
extent than those who aided in the international humanitarian response to the 
2010 earthquake in Haiti. 
Another important future study would be an examination of ethical 
issues surrounding the use of “big data” in the field of international 
humanitarian aid. Just as people in the industrialised world have qualms about 
questionable uses of big data, privacy, safety of personal information from 
hackers, the characterisation of individuals into categories, et cetera (Martin, 
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2015), victims of disasters in developing countries may also hold reservations 
about having their information stored in a database. 
Closing Remarks 
This research is of particular importance because as climate change 
worsens, natural disasters are becoming increasingly common. When a disaster 
strikes, kind-hearted individuals around the world donate their time, money, 
and expertise to help those affected by the disaster. In recent years, there have 
been great advances in information and communication technology that can 
assist in making disaster relief and recovery more efficient, saving lives and 
ameliorating outcomes for victims of disaster. However, these tools are being 
underutilised in favour of discourse and political agendas. Knowing why data 
are underutilised, and where they can be better utilised, is an important first 
step in encouraging future humanitarian aid workers to use data to their—and 
to their beneficiaries’—advantage. 
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